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In this work, we propose an argumentation-based dialogue model designed for Web-based
Group Decision Support Systems, that considers the decision-makers' intentions. The intentions
are modeled as behavior styles which allow agents to interact with each other as humans would
in face-to-face meetings. In addition, we propose a set of arguments that can be used by the
agents to perform and evaluate requests, while considering the agents' behavior style. The
inclusion of decision-makers' intentions intends to create a more reliable and realistic process.
Our model proved, in di®erent contexts, that higher levels of consensus and satisfaction are
achieved when using agents modeled with behavior styles compared to agents without any
features to represent the decision-makers' intentions.
Keywords: Web-based group decision support systems; argumentation; multi-agent systems;
decision-making; multi-criteria problems; cognitive aspects.
1. Introduction
It is known that many of the decisions taken in organizations are made in groups.1
Group decision-making is a process in which a group of people, called participants,
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act collectively to analyze a set of variables, considering and evaluating the available
alternatives, selecting one or more solutions for a certain problem. The number of
participants involved in the process is variable and all of them may be either at the
same place and at the same time or geographically dispersed at di®erent times.2
There are two main reasons for which decisions are made in groups: on the one hand,
most of the current organizations organigrams involve several decision-makers,2 both
at the strategic3 and at the technical level,4 on the other hand, group decisions can
potentiate the decision quality.5–7 Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS) have
been widely studied throughout the last decades to support this type of decisions.8–11
However, in the last 10/20 years, we have seen a remarkable change in the context
where the decision-making process happens, especially in large organizations.12–14
With the emergence of global markets, the growth of multinational organizations
and a more globalist view of the planet, we can easily ¯nd decision-makers (chief
executive o±cers, managers and other members of global virtual teams) spread
around the world, in countries with di®erent time zones.15 Moreover, it is especially
complex to support the group decision-making process in this context, due to the
decision-makers being geographically dispersed. This can lead to additional
problems: failure to communicate and retain contextual information, unevenly
distributed information, di±culty to communicate and to understand the salience
of information, di®erences in the speed of access to information, and di±culty to
interpret the meaning of silence16; and to deal with temporal issues, which can
originate: ambiguity, con°icting temporal interests and constraints, and scarcity of
temporal resources.17 To provide an answer and operate correctly in this type of
scenarios, the traditional GDSS have evolved to what is known as Ubiquitous/Web-
based Group Decision Support Systems (Web-based GDSS).18–20 The idea behind
the Web-based GDSS is to support the group decision-making process \anytime"
and \anywhere", and help deal with some of the referred problems.21,22
In a group decision-making process, there is a con°ict of interests and each
party involved may (or may not) have di®erent objectives and needs that intends
to satisfy and pursuit.23 Some strategies that can be used in Web-based GDSS
have been proposed over the years such as Multiple-Criteria Decision Analysis
(MCDA)24–27 methods and automatic negotiation models (game theory, heuristics
and argumentation).28–30 These strategies intend to help decision-makers in
achieving an agreement through frameworks and other speci¯c strategies.31–33
During a real face-to-face decision-making process, dialogues can assume di®erent
types like: persuasion, information-seeking, inquiry, among others.34 The argumen-
tation-based dialogue models can be a suitable strategy to help overcome the lack of
interaction inherent to the decision-making processes in which decision-makers are
geographically dispersed.29,35,36 They allow agents (that represent decision-makers) to
exchange proposals, including justi¯cations and explanations, which are essential for
an agent to negotiate with other agents.37 Furthermore, the arguments can be used
to inform decision-makers about the reasons why agents propose a certain solution.38
Themost striking approaches were proposed about two decades ago.39–41 Since then, we











































































































































have seen di®erent (extensions) approaches to formulate argumentation frameworks,
such as: abstract argumentation,42,43 logic-based argumentation,44,45 value-based ar-
gumentation,46,47 assumption-based argumentation,48,49 among others.50 However,
these approaches deal with argumentation as a somewhat one-sided-process \in
which a single party merely presents a reasoned justi¯cation".51 In the context of
group decision-support, the paradigm is di®erent, the argumentation is \an informed
exchange of ideas and positions involving several contributors: in other words,
argumentation concerning an issue", which typically, arises as a dialogical process.51
Some strategies have been proposed to deal with dialogical processes,52–54 most of
which are oriented to multi-agent systems and formalize some typical aspects, such
as: locutions, utterances, rules for dialogue continuation and termination. However,
when we search for argumentation-based dialogue models speci¯cally adapted to
GDSS, the results are almost inexistent. The few existing results are outdated 36,55
and even if some seemed promising in the way they could be adapted to this area,40,41
the works that came next followed (most of the times) another path (despite some of
them remain within decision support).
The bene¯ts inherent to group decision-making must not be overlooked when
developing Web-based GDSS. A typical face-to-face meeting allows decision-makers
to interact, exchange ideas and work on and generate new knowledge and intelli-
gence.5–7 As we had seen, (in an ideal scenario) we can achieve some of these bene¯ts
using automatic negotiation models (for instance: argumentation-based dialogue
models). However, more factors should be considered besides the \messages"
exchanged by decision-makers to correctly represent decision-makers. This repre-
sentation can range from criteria's evaluation (for instance in a multi-criteria
problem56 to a complete representation of the individual (for instance: personality,
emotions and mood.57–59 The face-to-face meetings bene¯t from the decision-makers'
heterogeneity60 as it is related to the decision-makers' temperament but also with the
decision-makers' intentions. Let us consider a scenario where a group of friends
intends to choose a restaurant to celebrate the anniversary of one of them. Obvi-
ously, as in any other multi-criteria problem, each person would have his own pre-
ferences concerning each of the possible alternatives. However, how important would
be the consideration of each element's intentions? Is it possible that some just want
to please the birthday person? If so, should not they be more willing to accept that
person preferences? What would happen if they used a Web-based GDSS which only
considered the preferences of participants (towards alternatives and criteria) and
ignored their intentions? Would the group satisfaction resulting from the decision
made be the expected? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to allow
decision-makers to con¯gure not only their preferences (on alternatives and criteria),
but also their intentions and other aspects that may be relevant, so that their po-
sition can be expressed with the best possible representation.
Modeling agents with human-like is not a novelty. In fact, at the start of the new
millennium, some projects dealing with agents' humanization began to appear.61
Nowadays, there are many proposals that intend to model human characteristics in











































































































































agents, such as: personality,62,63 emotions,57,64 cognitive styles,65 among others.66–68
There are also some proposals targeted towards GDSS.59,69–71 All of them share the
idea that including cognitive/a®ective aspects will contribute in some way to the
decision-making process. However, to the best of our knowledge, most of them are
envisaged for use in simulated environments. The usage of such techniques in real
systems canbring somedisadvantages. For example, \a realme" canbe abadapproach
if my persona is less persuasive/intelligent/capable than others. No one will be inter-
ested in using an application that depreciates you.Moreover, including aspects such as
personality does not allow to re°ect other aspects such as intentions andobjectives. For
each decision-maker, the objectives and intentions can vary even for the same problem.
In the previous example (to select a restaurant to celebrate the birthday of one of the
group members), we could use the decision-makers' personality to de¯ne the interac-
tions between agents and how each agent behaves, however this approach is not
enough to identify the intentions of each one of the decision-makers.
In this paper, we propose an argumentation-based dialogue model to support
decision-makers in the group decision-making process. In our proposal each agent can
assume a style of behavior to represent the intentions of the decision-maker. This
behavior is responsible for de¯ning how agents use the argumentation model and how
they evaluate received requests. Due to the speci¯c needs inherent to the group
decision-making process, our proposal allows agents to be: competitive between
them, i.e., allow agents to be capable of pursuing the decision-makers' preferences;
and collaborative, i.e., allow agents to work together to achieve the best outcomes for
the group. We intend to prove that the inclusion of styles of behavior is a major asset
in this type of context. In addition, we study if by including styles of behavior, the
amount of intelligence generated does not decrease (in fact, our goal is to generate
more and better intelligence). We also do not want to achieve a fake increase of the
consensus level just by including styles of behavior. It is important to know if agents
do not neglect their preferences while trying to defend the intentions of the decision-
maker. We believe that a correct representation of the decision-makers' intentions
improves the ability to achieve consensus and at the same time improves the decision
quality. However, with our proposal, we do not want to force the achievement of
consensus, and we want the process to °ow naturally, always knowing that sometimes
there might not be enough conditions to achieve consensus. We are considering a
process with almost no interaction between decision-makers, which means these de-
cision-makers require an iterative process to reason about the problem, to understand
other points of view and to recon¯gure their preferences. These points are respected in
our proposal. Finally, our proposal takes advantage of the bene¯ts associated to the use
of multiple agents and the use of group decision-making process through the agents'
capacity to represent the decision-makers' preferences and intentions.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following order: in the next section, we
contextualize the reader through the presentation of our previous approach to deal
with styles of behavior in the decision-making process. Our proposal is presented in
Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we deal with the evaluation and results and in Sec. 5 the discussion is











































































































































presented. In Sec. 6, we present the related work and ¯nally, some conclusions are
taken in Sec. 7, along with the work to be done hereafter.
2. Styles of Behavior for Decision-Making
There are a considerable number of proposals in the literature of computer science
related to the agents' humanization. Most of existing proposals have usedmodels such
as: Five Factor Model,72 OCC73 and PAD.74 To develop more intelligent applications,
we have seen an increasing of multi-disciplinary works. There are some models in the
literature of psychology that de¯ne roles/behaviors/designations of individuals.
These approaches can be used, adapted or included in simulators or real systems.
In this section, we describe a model previously proposed by us75 that intends to
allow agents to represent the decision-makers' intentions. A theoretical presentation
of this model is essential for a better comprehension of the work proposed in this
paper. We consider the decision-makers' intentions as what they: intend (a purpose),
plan, desire and/or aspire. Previously, we demonstrated (in the introduction section)
that intentions can vary for the same problem in di®erent situations/contexts. To
reach the decision-maker's intentions the agent should behave accordingly. We
adopted the con°ict styles proposed by Rahim and Magner,76 and rede¯ned them to
be more adequate to the context of group decision-making. We called them styles of
behavior and de¯ned them as follows:
. Dominating: A dominating individual believes that he owns the key to solve the
problem. He plays a very active role during the decision-making process and tries
to force his opinions on other participants;
. Integrating: An integrating individual favors a collaborative style. He aims to
achieve consensual decisions and greatly values his and others' opinions. He prefers
to manage assiduously the entire decision-making process;
. Compromising: A compromising individual favors a collaborative style. He aims
to achieve consensual decisions and values his and others' opinions. He plays a
moderately active role during the decision-making process;
. Obliging: An obliging individual tends to give up on his opinions in favor of the
group interests. He prefers to follow others' opinions rather than sharing his owns;
. Avoiding: An avoiding individual prefers to be freed from responsibility. Fun-
damentally, he prefers to not be involved in the decision-making process and
devalues both the process and the opinions of other participants.
Using a correlation between the work proposed by Rahim and Magner76 and the
facets identi¯ed by Costa and MacCrae77 we then proposed four dimensions suitable
to the context of group decision-making: activity level, resistance to change, concern
for self and concern for others. These dimensions represent:
. Activity level: High activity levels re°ect leadership and vigorousness. Low
activity levels re°ect leisurely and low need for thrills;











































































































































. Resistance to change: High resistance to change re°ect humble, eager to help
and easily moved. Low resistance to change re°ect aggressive, superior and
skeptical;
. Concern for self: High or low interests to satisfy his or her concerns;
. Concern for others: High or low interests to satisfy the concerns of others.
The information available in the literature only allows us to de¯ne each style of
behavior in these dimensions using classi¯cations as low, mid and high. However, to
computerize this model and to make agents correctly represent di®erent intentions,
we converted these classi¯cations into numerical values. Let us suppose that an
existent model considers a dominating behavior as the equivalent of having a low
concern for others. How can we know if whenever a decision-maker selects the
dominating behavior style to model his agent, he is expecting this \low concern for
others"? To deal with these issues, we ran a survey to understand if it was possible to
¯nd homogeneous answers to de¯ne each style of behavior in each dimension (nu-
merically). The objective was to verify if the behavior styles are perceived in the same
way and if that can be converted to a numerical value. The study involved 64
participants, 39 men and 25 women, aged between 19 and 68 years old (M ¼ 33:56;
SD ¼ 10:84) all of which either had higher education degrees or were undergraduate
students (10%). In respect to their ¯elds of expertise, respondents were professionals
from a wide variety of backgrounds, ranging from technology to social sciences. We
asked them to classify the ¯ve proposed behavior styles in four dimensions: Concern
for self; Concern for others; Resistance to change; and Activity level in a question-
naire with values ranging from 0 to 10 (by means of a visual analogic scale). All
respondents were asked to ¯ll out the questionnaire in the researcher's presence to
ensure engagement in the task and/or to aid in the clari¯cation of concepts or modes
of signaling the answers. We used the Intraclass Correlation Coe±cient to study the
agreement level. For all dimensions results were above 0.900 (more precisely between
0.915 and 0.941), with highly signi¯cant results (p < 0:001). The values obtained in
this study helped us to de¯ne the actuation levels for each style of behavior in each
dimension as can be consulted in Table 1 (the values were normalized to the [0,1]
range). This behavior style model plays an important role to understand the work
proposed in this paper. An interest ¯nding of this work was that none of the proposed
styles of behavior is always more advantageous over others regardless of context.
Table 1. Behavior style measures for each dimension.
Behavior style Activity
level ( X )
Resistance
to change ( X )
Concern
for self ( X )
Concern for
others ( X )
Dominating 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.17
Integrating 0.90 0.54 0.78 0.85
Compromising 0.58 0.42 0.55 0.62
Obliging 0.23 0.12 0.20 0.87
Avoiding 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.09











































































































































This is an incentive for decision-makers to choose the style of behavior that better ¯ts
their intentions.
3. Methods
In this paper, we consider the following structure of a decision problem: there are a
set of possible alternatives A, a set of criteria C , and a set of agents Ag, such that
each alternative a 2 A has a value for all the de¯ned criteria C . The decision problem
has a de¯ned communication language Lc which allows agents Ag to communicate.
To operate with the de¯ned Lc, there is a set of algorithms La, which specify for each
illocution ’ 2 Lc its e®ect. The relations between alternatives, criteria, agents,
communication language and algorithms jointly form a decision system, represented
as follows:
De¯nition 1. A decision system ðC ;A;Ag;Lc;LaÞ, is a ¯ve-tuple where:
. a set of criteria C ¼ fc1; c2; . . . ; cng; n > 0;
. a set of alternatives A ¼ fa1; a2; . . . ; amg;m > 0;
. a set of agents Ag ¼ fag1; ag2; . . . ; agkg; k > 0;
. a communication language Lc, consisting of a set of all illocutions;
. a set of algorithms working as regulation La for Lc, specifying for each locution
’ 2 Lc its e®ects.
An agent is a virtual representation of a decision-maker and is de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 2. An agent agi ¼ fagi ;Pragi ;Cag i ;Aagi ;Oagi ;Kagig is a seven-tuple
where:
. 8agi 2 Ag; i 2 f1; 2; . . . ; ng;
. agi is the agent's behavior style (Dominating, Compromising, Obliging, Inte-
grating, Avoiding and No Style);
. Pragi is the agent's protocol for Lc, specifying the `legal' moves at each instant t.
A protocol on Lc is a set of illocutions available to agi, where Pragi  Lc;
. Cag i is the agent's evaluation of each criterion, Cagi ¼ fEvc1 ;Evc2 ; . . . ;Evcng;
Evcj 2 f½0; 1;?g;
. Aagi is the agent's evaluation of each alternative, Aagi ¼ fEva1 ;Eva2 ; . . . ;Evang;
Evan 2 f½0; 1;?g;
. Oagi is the set of agent's objectives, Oag i  A [ C , preference relation  on the set
Oagi ;
. Kagi is the agent's knowledge, containing the list of all sent and received messages,
as well as the preferences of other agents, according to the knowledge he possess in
a certain time instant of t.
The agent's objectives (Oagi Þ are sorted in a list using the following formula:
AResultoi ¼
oi  CSþ NSND
   CO
CSþ CO ; ð1Þ












































































































































. oi is the assessment done to the objective i for which the result is being measured;
. CS is the value of Concern for Self;
. NS is the current number of agents supporting oi;
. ND is the total number of participating agents;
. CO is the value of Concern for Others.
Agent's objectives change throughout the decision-making process. This formula
relates the concern for self of the behavior style de¯ned by the decision-maker with
the evaluation done for each alternative (oi  CSÞ. This way, the agent can measure
the \analytical" interests of the decision-maker. Besides this, the formula relates the
number of supporters for each alternative with the concern for others of the de¯ned
behavior style which will allow the agent to measure the social interests of the
decision-maker (ðNSNDÞ  COÞ.
De¯nition 3. A behavior  i ¼ fRc i ;Al i ;Cs i ;Co ig is a four-tuple where:
. Rc i is the agent's resistance to change dimension value;
. Al i is agent's activity level dimension value;
. Cs i is the agent's concern for self dimension value;
. Co i is the agent's concern for others dimension value.
A behavior style is represented by the values on each dimension, e.g., Dominating
(0.92, 0.94, 0.95, 0.17). In this work, we used the value of each dimension to de¯ne
the probability for an agent performing an action:
. Activity level: probability for an agent to start a dialogue;
. Resistance to change: is used to de¯ne the acceptance range when an agent
receives a request;
. Concern for self: is used to order objectives and when the agent decides to
perform a \prefer" or a \question" illocution;
. Concern for others: is used in the evaluation of requests with the argument
appealing to common practices, to order objectives and when the agent decides to
perform a \prefer" or a \question" illocution.
Agents communicate by exchanging messages. Figure 1 represents the internal
message °ow of an agent. Messages exchanged by agents are de¯ned as illocutions.
Among other things, an illocution is composed by an utterance and may include (or
not) an argument. The agent begins by checking the type of illocution associated to
the received message. In the case of a request, it is evaluated and, based on the
evaluation, a response is generated indicating whether the request was accepted or
rejected. Based on these request-reception and response-formulation events, the
agent updates its \Self Preferences Knowledge Base" and ¯nally, sends the response
in the format of a message. In case of a Statement or Question illocution, the agent
begins by updating its \Opponents' Preferences Knowledge Base" according to the











































































































































new received knowledge. The agent then performs two actions. The ¯rst one, that
always and necessarily happens, which is to generate a message to respond to the
received message, and the second one which is to verify if, according to that new
knowledge, the necessary conditions to make a request are veri¯ed. To do so, the
agent checks for available arguments as well as opponents to receive those argu-
ments. If these conditions are veri¯ed the illocution is generated, and the request
message is sent.
An illocution is represented as follows:
De¯nition 4. An illocution  i ¼ ftr i ; ’ i ;  i ;Vr i ; ens i ;Enr i g is a six-tuple
where:
. i 2 f1; 2; . . . ; ng;
. tr i is the target associated with the illocution (can be null or be another illocu-
tion);
. ’ i is the utterance sent in the message;
.  i is the justi¯cation associated to the illocution (can be an argument or can be
null);
. Vr i is the set of variables associated to the illocution (Alternative or Criterion);
. ens i is the agent/user who sent the message;
. Enr i is the set of agents/users who will receive the message (can be 1 or several).
We de¯ned a set of possible illocutions (presented in Table 2). These illocutions
represent what agents can dialogue about using a typical multi-criteria problem
Fig. 1. Agents' communication work°ow.











































































































































con¯guration (for instance, using the template proposed in Ref. 56. We considered
eight di®erent illocutions (prefer, question, agree, disagree, no-knowledge, request,
accept and reject). The \prefer" type of illocutions is used mostly by agents with a
higher value of concern for self than the value of concern for others. We assume that
agents with a higher concern for self, try to \impose" their preferences to other
agents. The \questions" type of illocutions is used mostly by agents with a higher
value of concern for others than the value of concern for self. We assume that agents
with a higher concern for others are more concerned about other agents' opinions.
There is an impact associated with starting a dialogue using a \question" or a
\prefer" illocution. For example, when an agent says: \My preferred alternative
is ai", other agents can answer using four possible illocutions: agree, disagree,
question and no-knowledge. This means that at a certain moment in the process
those agents will know who is supporting ai and will not have any knowledge re-
garding other alternatives. This information has impact in the order of objectives of
each agent, a®ects the selection of arguments to use in requests and a®ects the
evaluation of requests.
Figure 2 is the sequence diagram that represents the proposed negotiation pro-
tocol. This diagram is a representation of our technical implementation and was
used in the prototype that was developed to run the simulations presented in Sec. 4.




prefer CS \For me the most important criterion/a is/
are 1; 2; . . . ; n"
Criterion 1=2= . . . =n
prefer CS \For me the less important criterion/a is/are
1; 2; . . . ;n"
Criterion 1=2= . . . =n
prefer CS \My preferred alternative/s is/are
1; 2; . . . ;n"
Alternative 1=2= . . . =n
prefer CS \My least preferred alternative/s is/are
1; 2; . . . ;n"
Alternative 1=2= . . . =n
question CO \Which criterion/a do you consider most
important?"

question CO \Which criterion/a do you consider less
important?"

question CO \Which alternative/s do you prefer?" 
question CO \Which alternative/s do you prefer to
discard?"

agree  \I agree." 
disagree  \I disagree." 
no-knowledge  \I do not have that information." 
request  \Do you accept the alternative x as the
solution?"
Alternative x
request  \Can you discard alternative x?" Alternative x
accept  \I accept." Alternative 1=2= . . . =n
reject  \I do not accept." Alternative 1=2= . . . =n











































































































































We created a Facilitator Agent (AgF) to manage the simulated meeting. We have
de¯ned two termination rules: when the agents have no more illocutions to exchange
between themselves and whenever consensus is reached. When an agent wants to
start a dialogue (using a \prefer" or a \question") he generates a participation time
based in his style of behavior. Obviously, the dominating and integrating agents have
a higher probability to start a dialogue because they have a higher value for the
activity level. The AgF will select the agent with the higher participation time and
allow that agent to speak ¯rst. All other agents are informed by AgF that they do not
have the right to speak. The messages exchanged between AgPðiÞ and AgPðxÞ
represent just an example of a dialogue between participating agents. The purpose of
this representation is to demonstrate what is happening when an agent adds a new
preference. Every time an agent adds a new preference he sends a message to AgF
Fig. 2. Agents' interaction work°ow.











































































































































informing about the new preference. The °ow represented between AgF and AgPðiÞ
is the same that occurs between AgF and all other participating agents.
3.1. The dialogue moves
It is now presented the set of dialogue moves used in this model. For each move, we
de¯ne what we call rationality rules, dialogue rules, and action rules. These are based
on the rules suggested by Maudet and Evrard.78 The rationality rules specify the
preconditions for playing the move. The action rules specify the move's implications.
The dialogue rules specify the next moves other agents can make, that corresponds to
the protocol under which the dialogue takes place.
We start with the dialogical move \prefer":
prefer( x _ null; ’ i ;  i ;Vr i ; ag i ;Enr i ) is an illocution  i in Lc.
rationality the agent ag i intends to declare his opinions about an alternative/s
or a criterion/a. He also intends to know if other agents agree/disagree with him and
to create a group supporting his preferences.
dialogue 8agj 2 Enr i can:
agree( i; ’ k ;  k ;Vr k ; agj ;Enr k
Þ,
disagree( i; ’ k ;  k ;Vr k ; agj ;Enr k
Þ,
request(null; ’ k ;  k ; ak ; agj ;Enr k
Þ,
no-knowledge( i; ’ k ;  k ;Vr k ; agj ;Enr k
Þ.
action retractð i 2 Prag i Þ, retractð i 2 Pragj Þ. All the agents that have  i in
their Pr will retract the illocution because we are dealing with a dialogue between
multiple agents. An agent that shares the same preferences will answer with an
\agree" so it does not make sense if that agent can use the same illocution again.
question(null; ’ i ;  i ;Vr i ; ag i ;Enr i Þ is an illocution  i in Lc.
rationality the agent ag i intends to perform a question when he wants to know
about other agents' preferences.
dialogue 8agj 2 Enr i can:
prefer( i; ’ k ;  k ;Vr k ; agj ;Enr k
Þ,
no-knowledge( i; ’ k ;  k ;Vr k ; agj ;Enr k
Þ.
action retractð i 2 Prag i Þ, retractð i 2 Pragj Þ. As we described in the \prefer"
illocution, here the agents will also perform the same actions for the same reasons.
Agents select whether to send a prefer or question illocutions based on their concern
for self and concern for others. An agent has a higher probability to send a prefer
illocution if his concern for self is higher than his concern for others. On the other
hand, an agent has a higher probability to send a question illocution if his concern for
others is higher than his concern for self. In case of agents without a de¯ned behavior
style, the illocution is selected randomly (50/50).
requestðnull; ’ i ;  i ; aj ; ag i ;Enr i Þ, where aj is an alternative being requested in  i
which is an illocution in Lc.











































































































































rationality the agent ag i performs a request when he believes there is a reason
for the other agent to accept it.
dialogue 8agj 2 Enr i can:
accept( i; ’ k ;  k ;Vr k ; agj ; ag i Þ,
reject( i; ’ k ;  k ;Vr k ; agj ; ag i Þ.
action retractð i 2 Prag i Þ.
agree( i; ’ k ;  k ;Vr k ; agj ;Enr k
Þ
rationality the agent agj informs about his agreement.
dialogue There is no dialogical sequence.
action 8agl 2 Enr k asserts Vr k in Oag j Kag l . When an agent agj states his
agreement about a  i, other agents assert this information.
accept( i; ’ k ;  k ; ai; agj ; aglÞ
rationality the agent agj informs about his acceptance.
dialogue There is no dialogical sequence.
action
agl asserts ai in Oagj Kag l
and agj asserts ai in Oagj and agj asserts  m in Pragj , where
 l is an illocution indicating the preference regarding alternative ai. The disagree,
reject and no-knowledge illocution are not speci¯ed because they do not have any
kind of consequences.
3.2. Requests
Throughout the dialogue agents exchange requests that can be followed by an ar-
gument (or not). To send a request an agent must decide what kind of request should
be made. This depends on the knowledge acquired during the dialogue and that is
associated with the preferences of other agents. The arguments that can be used in
each request are of three types: appeal to self-interest, appeal to prevailing practice
and appeal to common sense. The ¯rst two types were chosen based on literature and
were ¯rst proposed by Kraus et al.40 and were then adapted to later works in the area
of argumentation. The third type is introduced in this paper and in the literature for
the ¯rst time and is essential to make the negotiation process closer to what can be
observed in real scenarios. It is common to ¯nd in the literature argumentation
models that use argument types such as rewards or threats, however in our proposal
we did not consider these types mainly because they cannot be used to discuss the
problem's speci¯c information. In fact, the information exchanged using these types
of arguments may not be related to the problem at all. For example, an agent ag1
threatening another agent ag2 who does not want to go to restaurant a1 by saying he
will not be invited to future meetings does not bring more intelligence to the decision-
making process, regardless of how it could help unlocking more con°ictual situations.
Our approach focuses entirely on a logic to achieve the best possible level of con-
sensus while always maintaining the same level of concern towards the amount of











































































































































intelligence that can be generated. The idea is to support decision-makers using
valuable knowledge instead of supporting fake consensual decisions every time this
knowledge could be concealed. Below we move on to a more detailed description of
each one of the argument types that have been considered.
Appeal to self-interest. This argument is used whenever an agent intends to
convince another agent to accept a request claiming to be of his interest to accept it.
This happens whenever an agent prefers a certain criterion and prefers an alternative
which does not have the best values for the preferred criterion.
Example 1. Let us consider a car purchase example with two criteria
c1 ¼ Price; c2 ¼ Durability, two alternatives a1 ¼ ð10000¤; 8 yearsÞ; a2 ¼ ð15000¤;
10 yearsÞ and two agents ag1 with Oag1 ¼ fa2; c1g and ag2 with Oag2 ¼ fa1; c1g.
Looking at ag1 we know that his current objective is to choose the second alter-
native as the solution to the problem. However, since ag1 prefers criterion c1 then
agent ag2 is in condition to send a request message  1 appealing to self-interest of
ag1, where  1 ¼ \Accept a1 because a1 is cheaper than a2."
Appeal to prevailing practice. This argument is used whenever an agent intends
to convince another agent to accept a request by referring to most participants which
have already accepted the requested alternative.
Example 2. Let us consider the same car purchase example and this time there
are ¯ve agents with the following objectives in time instant t: ag1 and Oag1 ¼ fa2g;
ag2 and Oag2 ¼ fa2g; ag3 and Oag3 ¼ fa2g; ag4 and Oag4 ¼ fa1g; and ag5 and
Oag5 ¼ fa1g. Both ag1, ag2, ag3 prefer alternative a1 and which means the total
number of agents in favour of a1 in time instant t corresponds to more than half of the
total number of participants. Therefore, either ag1, ag2 or ag3 could send a request
message  1 to ag4 or ag5 appealing to prevailing practice, where  1 ¼ \Accept a2
because it has been accepted by more than half of the total number of participants."
Appeal to common sense. This argument can be used to convince an agent if he is
the only one preferring a certain alternative while not accepting any other available
alternatives. This can be seen in real situations whenever a participant is stuck with
only one choice and refuses to accept di®erent opinions thus becoming an obstacle to
improve the °ow of the discussion. At ¯rst glance, this argument might seem to be a
type of appeal to prevailing practice, however if we look closer, we will see that both
kind of arguments are completely di®erent. An appeal to prevailing practice is an
argument that involves an action performed by other agents. On the other hand, the
appeal to common sense, involves an individual action which the agent who receives
it did not perform yet.
Example 3. Let us consider the same car purchase example and this time there are
5 agents with the following objectives in time instant t: ag1 and Oag1 ¼ fa2g; ag2 and
Oag2 ¼ fa2g; ag3 and Oag3 ¼ fa2g; ag4 and Oag4 ¼ fa2g; and ag5 and Oag5 ¼ fa1g.











































































































































Only agent ag5 still has not accepted a2 so all other agents ag1, ag2, ag3, ag4 could
send a request message  1 to ag5 appealing to common sense, where  1 ¼ \You are
the only one who has still not accepted a2."
3.3. Selection
Each request may include one of each type of arguments presented above and an
agent may also send requests without arguments. Every time an agent exchanges
new information, each other agent will process that information and verify if he can
send a request or not. This request is not always targeted at the agent who shared the
information. In fact, there may be situations where an agent may be able to send a
request to someone else depending on the newly received information.
Example 4. Let us consider the same car purchase (considering ¯ve agents involved
in the process) example and this time there is an agent ag1 with Oag1 ¼ fa2g, and he
receives the following messages  1 and  2, where ens 1 ¼ ag2, ’ 1 ¼ \I prefer a2.",
ens 2 ¼ ag3, ’ 2 ¼ \I prefer a2.". This means ag1 now knows three agents prefer a2
and he could send a request message appealing to prevailing practice to ag4, even
though ag4 did not share any information.
Many proposed systems in the literature have been developed considering that an
agent will always start by selecting another agent to send the request and only then
will verify what type of argument is more adequate. In our proposal, we have chosen
a di®erent strategy where the agent will start by selecting the argument which we
consider to be most persuasive (according to strength level of the type of that ar-
gument) and only then select the agent that will receive the request. The order of the
arguments persuasion power is: appeal to common sense, appeal to self-interest,
appeal to prevailing practice and ¯nally simple request (request without an argu-
ment). This order is based on the de¯nitions proposed by Kraus et al.40 and the agent
will always try to send requests starting with the argument which we consider to be
stronger until no arguments can be selected and he is only allowed to make requests
without an argument.
3.4. Restrictions
Let us de¯ne a function that returns the number of agents which agent agi knows
that prefer alternative aj in a time instant of tk .
Fagentspreferalt : agi; aj ; tk ! 8ag 2 Kagi ;Oag  aj ^ tKagi ¼ tk :
Now, let us assume that agent ag1 sent a request message  1 to another agent ag2 to
accept alternative a1 in the time instant t1. Agent ag1 cannot send another request
message  2 in the time instant t2, if:
Enr 1 ¼ Enr 2 ¼ ag2 ^ Vr 1 ¼ Vr 2 ¼ a1 ^  1
¼  2 ^ jFagentspreferaltðag1; a1; t1Þj
¼ jFagentspreferaltðag1; a1; t2Þj:











































































































































In other words, an agent must not send more than one request to accept the same
alternative, to the same agent, with the same argument if the number of agents in
favor of that alternative is also the same for each request. This stops agents from
always sending the same request to the same agent which in turn will always refuse
that request. On the other hand, this strategy allows agents reusing requests sent to
the same agents under di®erent conditions.
Now, let us de¯ne a function that returns the number of agents which agent agi
still does not know their preferences in a time instant of tk :
Fagentsnopref : agi tk ! 8ag 2 Kagi ; jOagj ¼ 0 ^ tKagi ¼ tk
An agent ag1 cannot send a request message to ag2 appealing to common sense at the
time instant t1 if jFagentsnoprefðag1; t1Þj > 0. This means that agent ag1 still does not
know the preferences for each participant in that time instant. This is done so that
the agent does not use this type of request at the beginning of the discussion without
knowing if more agents share the same preferences of the agent that would receive
the request.
3.5. Evaluation
Our agents evaluate the requests with argument using subjective considerations.29
This means that our agents use \its own preferences and motivations in making that
judgement".
An agent may accept or refuse a request depending on its resistance to change
level. As mentioned before, resistance to change is one of the dimensions used to
model agent's style of behavior that we considered. With this, agents will make
requests depending not only on their preferences but also on their style of behavior.
In a very simple way we can say that the agent will:
Accept the request if:
RAP  PAPAI; ð2Þ
where:
. RAP is the Requested Alternative Preference;
. PAP is the Preferred Alternative Preference;
. AI is the Acceptance Interval.
Refuse the request if:
RAP < PAPAI: ð3Þ
The acceptance interval will vary depending on the resistance to change of the agent,
the argument type and any variable related to the argument.
3.6. Request  without an argument
When evaluating a request without an argument this interval will be a®ected by the
percentage of agents in favor of the requested alternative at the time it is received.











































































































































The formula used to calculate the acceptance interval for requests without argu-
ments (4) is:
AIrwa ¼ ð1 resistanceÞ 
NAFRA
TNA 1 ; ð4Þ
where:
. resistance is value of the resistance to change (of a speci¯c behavior style);
. NAFRA is the Number of Agents in Favor of Requested Alternative;
. TNA is the Total Number of Agents.
That means requests will always be evaluated according to the context. The AIrwa
value for an alternative ai increases as that alternative gains more supporters. The
agent can accept the request (formula 2) if the preference for the requested alter-
native is higher than the di®erence between his most preferred alternative and the
AIrwa that is measured. For agents without a de¯ned behavior we de¯ned the value of
resistance to change as 0.75.
3.7. Request  appealing to self-interest
When evaluating requests with the argument appealing to self-interest the accep-
tance interval is a®ected by the preference (normalized) of the agent towards the
criterion associated to the argument plus the value of AIrwa. The formula used to
calculate the acceptance interval for requests with the argument appealing to self-
interest (5) is
AIrsi ¼ ðð1 resistanceÞ  AIrwaÞ  CPNþ AIrwa; ð5Þ
where:
. CPN is the Normalization of the Preferred Criterion.
This allows the agent to widen its acceptance range according to the importance
given to the criterion associated to the argument appealing to self-interest.
In case the agent does not have a de¯ned behavior, the evaluation of the request






 1 RAPð Þ þ RAP; ð6Þ
where:
. NAFRA is the Number of Agents in Favour of Requested Alternative;
. TNA is the Total Number of Agents;
. CPN is the Normalization of the Preferred Criterion;
. RAP is the Requested Alternative Preference.











































































































































3.8. Request  common practices
When evaluating requests with the argument appealing to common practices the
acceptance interval is a®ected by the level of concern for others which the agent has
towards the alternative plus AIrwa. The formula used to calculate the acceptance
interval for requests with the argument appealing to common practices (6) is
AIrcp ¼ ðð1 resistanceÞ  AIrwaÞ  COþ AIrwa; ð7Þ
where:
. CO is the value of Concern for Others (of a speci¯c behavior style).
In case the agent does not have a de¯ned behavior, the evaluation of the request






 ð1 RAPÞ þ RAP; ð8Þ
where:
. NAFRA is the Number of Agents in Favor of Requested Alternative;
. TNA is the Total Number of Agents;
. RAP is the Requested Alternative Preference.
3.9. Request  common sense
When evaluating requests with the argument appealing to common sense the ac-
ceptance interval will be the opposite of the resistance's level of the agent. The
formula used to calculate the acceptance interval for requests with the argument
appealing to common sense (7) is:
AIcs ¼ ð1 resistanceÞ: ð9Þ
The appeal to common sense is used in very speci¯c situations. The agent that
receives this request is the only agent which is still against a consensual decision.
Therefore, the maximum acceptance interval will be used for the agent to verify if the
requested alternative can be accepted.
In case the agent does not have a de¯ned behavior, the evaluation of the request
with an argument appealing to common sense will be done based on the di®erence
between the number of agents in favor of requested alternative (NAFRA) and the
the number of agents in favor of the preferred alternative (NAFPA). The agent will
accept the alternative if:
NAFRA > NAFPA: ð10Þ











































































































































4. Evaluation and Results
In this section, we are going to describe all experiments that were conducted to
evaluate the proposed work. We used a group of 12 virtual agents with di®erent
styles of behavior for each experiment. We conducted an exhaustive number of
simulations to achieve solid results. We ¯rst detail the experimental settings and
describe the types of agents we benchmark our framework against as well as the
metrics used in our tests. Considering this, we provide the results of our experiments
and go on to analyze the results under di®erent agents' con¯gurations.
4.1. Experimental settings
In the considered scenario, agents negotiate to choose a desktop monitor for an
organization. That organization intends to buy 200 new desktop monitors to one of
its subsidiaries. Each agent represents one member of the organization administra-
tion board. This means agents must be cooperative because they all intend to choose
the best decision for that organization and they also must be competitive because
they aim to persuade other agents to accept what they believe that is the best
decision (according to their con¯guration).
Table 3 represents the multi-criteria problem. Five possible alternatives have
been identi¯ed. These alternatives have been classi¯ed according to ¯ve criteria: Size,
Resolution, Hz, Ms and Price. Considering that we do not only evaluate criteria while
trying to solve a multi-criteria problem, a decision-maker may prefer a certain al-
ternative for subjective or unknown reasons that are not speci¯ed in the problem
con¯guration.
We used the satisfaction and consensus levels as metrics to evaluate the overall
performance in di®erent scenarios. Satisfaction metric is used to measure the per-
ception of the quality (of the decision-maker represented by the agent) towards the
chosen alternative or the alternative supported by most agents during a certain
moment. For this, we used the de¯nitions proposed in Ref. 79 and the formulation
used in Ref. 80. The level of consensus is measured according to the alternative that
is supported by most agents in the time instant t, iteration i or round r. It is neither
mandatory nor negative if agents cannot achieve a consensual decision by the end of
the round. In fact, agents act according to an objective con¯guration logic
and through a \social interaction" that portrays the interests of decision-makers.
Table 3. Multi-criteria problem.
Alternatives Size Resolution Hz Ms Price
Asus 2700 ROG SWIFT PG278Q 27 2560*1440 144 1 699,99¤
BenQ 2700 XL2720Z 27 1920*1080 144 1 489,00¤
AOC 2400 E2476VWM6 24 1920*1080 60 1 154,90¤
BenQ 2400 XL2430T 24 1920*1080 144 1 399,00¤
LG 2700 27MP37VQ-B 27 1920*1080 60 5 210,80¤











































































































































This means that if an agent does not accept a certain alternative then the decision-
maker may still not be ready to accept it as well (although he may accept it in the
future). That decision-maker should ¯rst analyze and think about the new infor-
mation and eventually understand the situation and agree with it. Our approach
does not intend to force a solution at all costs. Because of this, we use these two
metrics (satisfaction and consensus) simultaneously. Our goal is to increase the levels
of consensus without diminishing the levels of satisfaction in any possible way.
Finding consensus while compromising the quality of the decision is not the solution.
The agents' preferences regarding alternatives and criteria, as well as their style of
behavior, were randomly generated. However, in order for the evaluation of alter-
natives and criteria to make sense, the following approach was used, where each
agent:
(1) Randomly generated his preferences for each of the existing alternatives. Those
preferences varied on the [0,1] interval, where 0 means \Not at all preferred" and
1 means \Extremely preferred";
(2) Selected the top preferred alternatives, i.e., those with the highest values;
(3) Checked for those (top preferred) alternatives which criteria stand out, i.e.,
which criteria (comparatively) make sense to be valued in order to prefer those
alternatives;
(4) And ¯nally, generated a random preference in a [0.5,1] interval for those stood
out criteria, and a random preference in a [0,0.5] interval for the remaining
criteria.
4.2. Experiments
In the ¯rst experiment, 35*101 simulations were performed. In each set of 101
simulations (let us call it a scenario) the preferences of each agent towards the
problem (alternatives and criteria) were the same. Each simulation included
12 agents. In the ¯rst simulation, all 12 agents were con¯gured without a de¯ned
behavior and in the following 100 simulations di®erent styles of behavior were gen-
erated for each agent in each simulation. We then compared the obtained results
between agents with a de¯ned behavior in 100 simulations and agents con¯gured
without a de¯ned behavior.
Figure 3 shows the satisfaction values obtained by agents without a de¯ned be-
havior (AgWDB) and the average satisfaction values obtained by agents with a
de¯ned behavior (AgDB).
Since both AgWDB and AgDB average satisfaction values are being compared it
is important to know what this average means. For that, Fig. 4 shows the number of
times in which AgDB obtained a higher or lower satisfaction in each scenario. It is
possible to identify that in most scenarios AgDB obtained a higher satisfaction.
Counting all simulations performed in this experiment, the satisfaction was higher in
70.2% of the times and lower in 29.8% of the times. Another important point is











































































































































related with the obtained average satisfaction value. AgDB obtained in all simula-
tions an average of 0.147 while AgWDB obtained just 0.069.
The impact of situations where AgDB obtained a higher or lower satisfaction
compared to AgWDB was also studied. It was important to know if there was a big
di®erence when AgDB obtain a lower satisfaction compared to AgWDB. Figure 5
shows the results between the average gain and loss of satisfaction of AgDB and
AgWDB. In 70.2% of the times where AgDB obtained a higher satisfaction, the
Fig. 4. Number of times when AgDB obtain more/less satisfaction than AgWDB in each scenario.
Fig. 5. Gain/loss of satisfaction every time AgDB obtain more/less satisfaction than AgWDB.
Fig. 3. Satisfaction values obtained in each scenario.











































































































































average gain was of 0.158, however in 29.8% of the times where AgDB obtained a
lower satisfaction, the average loss was of 0.117.
Figure 6 shows the consensus values obtained by AgWDB and the average con-
sensus values obtained by AgDB in each scenario. It is possible to see that AgDB also
a higher consensus compared to AgWDB in most of the times.
Figure 7 shows the number of times in which AgDB obtained more/less/same
consensus than AgWDB. AgDB obtained a higher average consensus in 74.3% of the
times, equal in 14.5% of the times and lower in 11.1% of the times.
As we did in the satisfaction analysis, the impact of gain and loss of consensus was
also analyzed in situations where the consensus is higher or lower, respectively.
Figure 8 shows the results that were obtained. As can be seen, the gain of consensus is
higher (0.192 average) when the consensus obtained is also higher and the loss is
lower (0.091 average) when the consensus obtained is also lower.
In the second experiment, 35*6 simulations were performed. In each scenario
agents had di®erent problem con¯gurations (regarding alternatives and criteria). For
all six simulations in the same scenario agents' con¯gurations were the same. In each
simulation, 12 agents were used and were all de¯ned with the same style of behavior
(1st Simulation  12 AgWDB, 2nd Simulation  12 agents Integrating, 3rd
Simulation  12 agents Obliging, 4th Simulation  12 agents Dominating, 5th
Simulation  12 agents Compromising and 6th Simulation  12 agents Avoiding).
Fig. 6. Consensus values obtained in each scenario.
Fig. 7. Number of times when AgDB obtain more/less consensus than AgWDB in each scenario.











































































































































Figure 9 shows the satisfaction results obtained by agents with the same style of
behavior throughout all 35 scenarios. Integrating agents achieved higher satisfaction
levels compared to other agents while it seems that Dominating agents, on the
opposite turn, obtained the lower satisfaction levels. The average satisfaction values
obtained for each style of behavior were the following: Integrating  0.122;
Compromising  0.097; Avoiding  0.05; Without a De¯ned Behavior  0.036;
Dominating  0.036 and Obliging  0.031.
Figure 10 shows consensus values obtained by agents in each simulation. It is
possible to see that both Obliging and Avoiding agents obtained the same consensus
most of the times (value 1 which means they achieved a consensual decision) and
therefore appear overlaid. In this experiment, it was possible to identify that Obliging
and Avoiding agents always obtained the highest consensus, Dominating agents
obtained the lowest consensus and the remaining styles of con°ict obtained inter-
mediate values. Besides this, and looking at the graph, the consensus values obtained
by each group of agents with the same style of behavior are very consistent
throughout all 35 scenarios, even if agents' con¯gurations were di®erent in all of
them. The average consensus for each style of behavior for each scenario was the
following: Obliging  0.959; Avoiding  0.945; Integrating  0.73; Compromis-
ing  0.728; Without a De¯ned Behavior  0.609 and Dominating  0.39.
Fig. 9. Satisfaction obtained in each scenario.
Fig. 8. Gain/loss of consensus every time AgDB obtain more/less consensus than AgWDB.












































































































































In this section, all the hypotheses are discussed. The ¯rst hypothesis is the most
important and is the reason for all the experiments performed in this work. The other
hypotheses were identi¯ed as the study progressed. Given this, we postulate several
hypotheses regarding the performance and behavior of the agents.
Hypothesis 1. Agents that represent/support decision-makers in the ubiquitous
group decision-making process and that use styles of behavior can obtain higher
consensus and quality decisions more easily.
AgDB obtained higher satisfaction levels compared to AgWDB in 70.2% of the
simulations and obtained higher consensus levels in 74.3% of the times. Besides this,
it was also veri¯ed that in the 70.2% of the times when the satisfaction obtained
is higher, there was a gain of satisfaction that was superior (0.158) to the loss
of satisfaction (0.117) in the remaining 29.8% of the times when the satisfac-
tion obtained is lower. These results were very positive. In the case when the con-
sensus obtained was higher, the gains were even more signi¯cant. Not only do agents
obtained higher consensus in more simulations (89.9%), the gain was also higher
(0.192). On the other hand, the consensus obtained was lower in the remaining 11.1%
of the times with a loss of 0.091. With these results con¯rmed we have all the
necessary conditions to accept the formulated hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Agents with a higher level of concern for others obtain higher sat-
isfaction levels.
This hypothesis was rejected. Integrating and Obliging are the styles of behavior
with the highest level of concern for others, followed by Compromising style, and
lastly Avoiding and Dominating styles. The hypothesis was rejected since Obliging
agents achieved low average satisfaction levels when agents with the same style of
behavior were being studied. By rejecting this hypothesis, we did formulate a new
one (Hypothesis 2.1).
Hypothesis 2.1. Agents that are naturally more competitive and collaborative
obtain higher satisfaction levels.
Fig. 10. Consensus obtained in each scenario.











































































































































If we make a purely comparative analysis (as done in the second experiment) we
can accept this hypothesis. We veri¯ed that Integrating and Compromising styles,
which have very similar concern for self and concern for others values, achieved the
highest levels of satisfaction. This may lead us to think that other styles only harm
the process. However, (as can be seen) in the ¯rst experiment (when we used agents
with all sorts of styles) agents achieved an average satisfaction level of 0.147 which is
superior to the value obtained by Integrating agents (0.122). This let us conclude
that the diversity of styles of behavior allows obtaining higher satisfaction levels
compared to the situation where all agents share the same style. Considering that we
live in a diversi¯ed reality, this hypothesis would be rejected. This conclusion allows
formulating a new hypothesis that was not studied in this work: Obliging agents, due
to their high level of concern for others and low level of concern for self, are especially
useful in scenarios where other agents with di®erent styles of behavior also partici-
pate. The study of Obliging agents is a paradox.
Hypothesis 3. Agents with a low concern for self obtain consensus more easily.
Obliging and Avoiding agents have the lowest level of concern for self, followed by
Compromising agents while Integrating and Dominating agents have the highest
level of concern for self. If we just look at the concern for self we are forced to reject
the hypothesis, because Integrating agents have a higher concern for self compared to
Compromising agents but still obtain slightly higher average consensus levels.
However, we have identi¯ed a pattern that let us explain this situation. Obliging
agents obtained higher average consensus levels compared to Avoiding agents even
though both styles share almost the same level of concern for self. However, since
Obliging agents have higher level of concern for others this let us believe that in
situations where agents with the same concern for self will obtain higher consensus
levels if they have a higher concern for others. This explains why Integrating agents
obtain slightly higher consensus levels compared to Compromising agents.
Hypothesis 4. Using agents de¯ned with a style of behavior is always advantageous.
This hypothesis has been rejected because we can see in the second experiment
Dominating agents obtained worse satisfaction and consensus values compared with
AgWDB. This means that in a hypothetical situation in which all decision-makers
choose the Dominating style of behavior they would obtain worse results in case we
did not use any kind of behavioral modeling. However, we consider that a situation in
which all agents are de¯ned with the Dominating style can still generate valuable
knowledge that can be used in the future to support the group decision-making
process in that kind of scenario. On the other hand, when we only deal with AgWDB
we cannot generate and use such kind of knowledge.
It is also important to relate this work with current literature. As referred before,
our argumentation-based dialogue model aims to support the group decision making
process. Our approach is very di®erent to what can be found in literature. This is
because our model was de¯ned in order to take advantage of what the bene¯ts











































































































































associated with the group decision-making process are. Thus, contrary to what
happens in most of the existing proposals,81,82 our model deals with several types of
dialogue, since, despite the goal to achieve consensus, there is also the goal to en-
hance the quality of the decision. Therefore, our model focuses not only on dialogue
types such as negotiation or persuasion, but also on strategies that allow agents
to discover new information and perceive the reasons for the preferences of other
decision-makers.
The di®erence of the proposal presented in this work is also distinguished by the
way it is validated. A lot of works are validated using the Seller/Buyer exam-
ple37,83,84 which is a context completely di®erent from the one presented in this work.
As we said, we do not want to make a deal, nor want agents to reach a consensus at
any costs. Our model aims to support the decision-making process by using and
creating new knowledge. Our work takes advantage of the typical bene¯ts inherent
to group decision-making and proved that it is possible to obtain results that follow
that perspective. That is why we included in the evaluation phase both metrics, the
level of consensus and the level of satisfaction.
Other authors with a relevant work in this area considered in very recent papers
that most the work found in the literature related to argumentation-based decision-
making did not pay attention to decision-making amongst multiple agents. In fact,
Fan and Toni85 refer to the necessity of studying \decision-making in the context of
multiple agents, in which agents may share potentially con°icting knowledge and
preferences". In our work, besides proposing a model that supports multiple agents
interacting in a very similar way as humans do in face-to-face meetings, the created
prototype had an exceptional performance without presenting any sort of issues.
One of the main points of this work is the capacity the agents start to have to
represent the intentions of the decision-makers. Although there are some works in the
¯eld of decision-making in which the authors try to make this type of representa-
tion,20,33,59,70 it is done in a very ambiguous way, where the values of performance of
those styles are not scienti¯cally validated, being merely indicative and approx-
imations of what is thought to make sense. In addition, they do not validate in a real
system if the decision-makers would be able to con¯gure and understand the
objectives of each of those styles. Although it is obvious that it would be advanta-
geous to include a®ective components in this type of context, it had never been
proved as it happens in this work.
Finally, it is not less important to mention the potential that the proposal here
presented has to document and explain the reasons that lead to a certain decision.
Muller and Hunter86 consider that it is very important that argumentation models
can generate documentation and also explain why certain decisions are made. Our
approach is also clear to the decision-maker and allows him to understand the process
and properly explains the reason why a certain solution is decided. Knowing how
agents communicate with each other, the text composing each locution could be used
to make that documentation.












































































































































Black and Hunter81 presented a framework for representing dialogues of the type
inquiry. Their argumentative system is based in Defeasible Logic Programming
(DeLP). In their work, they consider two types of inquiry dialogues: argument in-
quiry and warrant inquiry. The former intends that agents can jointly construct
arguments to support a particular claim that would not be possible if done separately
(alone). The latter intends that agents can share arguments in order to construct a
dialectical tree that they could not do alone with their own beliefs. In these two types
of inquiry dialogues, agents jointly seek to inquire about topics. However, the ar-
gument inquiry dialogue does not allow to determine the acceptability of the con-
structed arguments, and in case of the warranty inquiry dialogue the agents work
together to determine the acceptability of the arguments (they do this by jointly
constructing a dialectical tree). The authors named the communicative acts as
\moves". They considered the existence of three di®erent moves: open, assert and
close. A move is represented as hAgent, Act, Contenti, where Agent is the agent
generating the move, Act is the type of the move and Content contains information
about the details of the move. The dialogue is always performed by exactly two
agents and always starts by an \open" move. They represent the ¯rst move as
hx open, dialogue (; )i, where  is the type of the dialogue and  is the topic of the
dialogue. So, the type and the topic of the dialogue are de¯ned in the content of the
¯rst move. The dialogue ends when both agents make the \close" move.
Prakken82 proposed a formal framework of argumentation dialogues for persua-
sion. In his work, he presents an example of a persuasion dialogue, which we present
below:
(1) ag1: My car is very safe. (making a claim)
(2) ag2: Why is your car safe? (asking grounds for a claim)
(3) ag1: Since it has an airbag. (o®ering alternative grounds for a claim)
(4) ag2: That is true, (persuasion: conceding a claim) but I disagree that this makes
your car safe: the newspapers recently reported on airbags expanding without
cause. (stating a counterargument)
(5) ag1: Yes, that is what newspapers say (conceding a claim) but that does not
prove anything, since newspaper reports are very unreliable sources of techno-
logical information. (undercutting a counterargument)
(5) ag2: Still your car is still not safe, since its maximum speed is very high.
(alternative counterargument)
This example demonstrates the complexity of the persuasion dialogues. As we can
see, during a dialogue of this type, an individual/agent can refer back to previous
choices in the same dialogue, as well as justify a certain point of view in di®erent
ways.
In his work, Prakken82 introduced the \liberal" and \relevant" dialogue systems.
Table 4 presents the moves for liberal dialogues.











































































































































As in the work of Black and Hunter,81 Prakken's liberal dialogues are represented
as trees and the arguments of a tree are always relative to only one topic. An
argument is a deduction with a conclusion (conc) and premises (prem), and \An
argument B extends an argument A if concðBÞ ¼ ’ and ’ 2 prem(A)". The author
also de¯ned a turn-taking function that speci¯es which agent does the next move,
which basically guarantees the existence of a \ping-pong" dialogue, where the ¯rst
move is responsible for specifying the dialogue's topic. One of the most relevant parts
of this work is the way Prakken determines the outcome of a dialogue by de¯ning an
in/out labeling. Theoretically, what happens is that a node is in if it withstands its
attacks, otherwise it is out. So, considering that the root of a dialogue is responsible
for de¯ning the topic, the proponent wins the dialogue if the root node is in.
Parsons et al.87 presented a study about argumentation-based dialogues between
agents. They have de¯ned locutions from which agents can exchange arguments. In
addition, agents may adopt di®erent attitudes which will condition the arguments
that they can build and what locutions they can make. They also de¯ned a set of
protocols which determine the entire functioning of the dialogue (termination, dia-
logue outcomes and complexity). In this work, they deal with three types of dialo-
gues: information seeking, inquiry and persuasion. They assume the dialogues are
always performed by only two agents, which can use several utterances, such as:
assert, accept, challenge and question. One of the most fascinating points of this work
is the relation de¯ned between the agents' attitudes and their way of acting. For
instance, an agent can have three di®erent assertion attitudes: con¯dent, careful and
thoughtful, and three acceptance attitudes: credulous, cautious and skeptical.
Next, an example of a possible information seeking dialogue is presented, using
the protocol proposed by the authors:
(1) ag1 asks questionðpÞ;
(2) ag2 replies either assertðpÞ or assertð:pÞ if it can, and assertðUÞ if it cannot.
Which response is given will depend upon the contents of its knowledge base and
its assertion attitude. U indicates that, for whatever reason, B cannot give an
answer;
(3) ag1 either accepts B's response, if its acceptance attitude allows, or challenges.
U cannot be challenged and as soon as it is asserted, the dialogue terminates
without the question being resolved;
Table 4. Speech acts for liberal dialogues (adapted from Prakken Ref. 82).
Acts Attacks Surrenders
claim ’ why ’ concede ’
why ’ argue A(concðAÞ ¼ ’) retract ’
argue A why ’(’ 2 prem(A)) argue B(B defeats A) concede ’ (’ 2 prem(A) or ’ ¼ conc(A))
concede ’
retract ’











































































































































(4) ag2 replies to a challenge with an assertðSÞ, where S is the support of an argu-
ment for the last proposition challenged by ag1;
(5) Go to 3 for each proposition in S in turn;
(6) ag1 accepts p if its acceptance attitude allows.
There is a large number of applications of dialogue systems in literature34,88,89
covering various topics, such as: resource-bounded reasoning,90,91 legal reason-
ing,92,93 to support agent interaction87,94 among others. However, argumentation-
based dialogue models speci¯cally targeted at the context of group decision-making
and that bene¯t from group decision-making are practically nonexistent.
Many approaches have been put forward in literature, where agents are de¯ned
with characteristics that set them apart from each other.95–98 Also under the topic of
group decision-making several works with agents have been proposed,99,100 some of
which used agents as a way to represent decision-makers/experts.33,59,101 This re-
presentation of decision-makers allows the systems to become more intelligent and
dynamic, given that they are capable of dealing with aspects of great relevance
in face-to-face type meetings. Next, we will see some works in the context of the
decision-making that present strategies to represent the decision-makers.
Santos et al.59 presented a scienti¯c work where they proposed a multi-agent
architecture model designed to support groups in the decision-making process. The
novelty of their work is the possibility to model the agent's personality. The idea is to
humanize agents and with that, facilitate the negotiation process. They used four
personality types (Negotiator, Aggressor, Submissive and Avoider) based on the Five
Factor Model102 to de¯ne the agents' personalities. To select the agent's personality,
each decision-maker needs to answer a questionnaire named Big Five Inventory.103
They also proposed a simple negotiation model where the agents use the personalities
to choose which kind of requests they should send and to process the received
requests. The publication does not include any case study; however, the content is
very interesting because the proposed model is based in strong assumptions existent
in the literature.
Palomares et al.70 presented a Web-based consensus support system that permits
the integration of the decision-makers' attitude regarding consensus. They study the
importance that decision-makers place in reaching consensus regarding the possi-
bility of modifying their own preferences. Decision-makers can/adopt three atti-
tudes: pessimistic, indi®erent and optimistic. For example, a decision-maker who
adopts an optimistic attitude, means that for him to reach the agreement is more
important than his own preferences. As a result, the group's options will be given
more importance. They argue that (as might be expected) optimistic attitudes help
to reach consensus while pessimistic attitudes hamper the achievement of consensus.
Recio-García et al.71 presented a group decision support system where each de-
cision-maker is represented by an agent who argues with the other agents in order to
achieve the best alternative for the group. The presented negotiation model includes
the users' social factors, personality and trust in the argumentative process.











































































































































The personality of decision-makers is represented by a number ranging from [0,1]
where 0 means a very cooperative person and the re°ection of a very sel¯sh one. To
study the concept of trust, they use the interaction of decision-makers in social
networks through a set of 10 factors. For the argumentation model, they used
D2ISCO, which is a platform for the design and implementation of deliberative and
collaborative CBR applications. They concluded that the proposed model allows to
achieve better satisfaction rates when compared to the standard \fully connected"
group recommender.
Palomares and Martínez33 presented a semisupervised consensus support system
(CSS) based on the multi-agent system paradigm. The main purposes are to
overcome the di±culties associated with managing large groups of experts and the
need for constant human supervision. In order to minimize the need for experts'
interactions with the system, they de¯ned a strategy that allows the experts to
express their individual concerns. To do so, they de¯ned three di®erent pro¯les: sure
pro¯le, unsure pro¯le and neutral pro¯le. The ¯rst, intends to represent experts that
are very con¯dent about their preferences. Therefore, they do not intend to change
them. The second, represents experts that want to achieve a consensus but are
unsure about their opinions. The third, represent the experts that want to achieve a
consensus and are moderately sure about their opinions. They conducted a case
study made up by a set of experiments with the intent of understanding the di®erent
evolution of the degree of consensus between the proposed semisupervised CSS and
a full-supervised CSS. They concluded that through the proposed system it was
possible to minimize the need for expert human supervision and more importantly,
they concluded that their proposal helps to achieve high levels of consensus faster
than the full-supervised CSS.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
The future and success of organizations depend greatly on the quality of every
decision made. It is known that many of the decisions taken inside organizations are
made in group. To support this type of decision, the Group Decision Support Sys-
tems (GDSS) have been widely studied throughout the last decades. However, in the
last 10/20 years, we have seen a remarkable change in the context where the
decision-making process happens, especially in large organizations. With the ap-
pearance of global markets, the growth of multinational enterprises and a more
global vision of the planet, we easily ¯nd chief executive o±cers and top managers
(decision-makers) spread around the world, in countries with di®erent time zones. To
provide an answer and to operate correctly in this type of scenarios the traditional
GDSS have evolved to what we identify today as Web-based Group Decision Sup-
port Systems (Web-based GDSS). The idea behind the Web-based GDSS is to
support the decision-making process \anytime" and \anywhere". However, sup-
porting groups in this context is a very complex task. It is necessary to create
conditions in which the decision-maker can acknowledge the advantages of using the











































































































































system and feels motivated to do so. The system must allow the decision-maker to
express himself and this includes problem and communication con¯gurations. We
must keep in mind that the best algorithm will fail if the ¯nal user does not want to
use it. Besides this, a Web-based GDSS must support decision-makers throughout
the decision-making process until the best solution can be found. This support
includes not only obtaining consensus but also the best possible solution. Therefore,
strategies that \hide" information just to achieve a faster solution must not be used.
In this work, we propose an argumentation-based dialogue model for Web-based
GDSS. This model provides a set of features that let us take advantage of the known
bene¯ts inherent to group decision-making. Our proposal allows agents to interact in
a very similar way as humans do in face-to-face meetings. Each agent represents a
real decision-maker and will attempt to defend his interests and persuade other
agents according to the knowledge he possesses. However, agents do not persuade
\foolishly" as they will be guided by the style of behavior de¯ned by their decision-
maker. Decision-makers may select ¯ve di®erent styles of behavior which de¯ne how
their agent will behave and act throughout the decision-making process, resulting in
a better representation of their interests and objectives. Each style of behavior
proposed in this work has been de¯ned according to four dimensions. To ¯gure how
agents will act in each dimension, real results were used and analyzed how people
expect an agent to behave depending on his style of behavior. This means that when
a decision-maker selects a certain style of behavior for his representing agent he is
unconsciously sharing information with the system.
We proposed a model that works well when multiple agents communicate and
interact with each other. Second, our work takes advantage of the bene¯ts inherent
to group decision-making. Our proposal lets decision-makers recognize the impor-
tance of the process. Third, and most importantly, with this work we have proved the
prevalence of using styles of behavior in this type of context. Our approach allows
decision-makers not only to con¯gure their preferences but also their intentions (for
instance: strategies and interest in the process). With this, we could conclude many
details explained previously, as for example, why agents with a high concern for
others tend to obtain higher satisfaction levels as well as agents with low concern for
self tend to obtain higher consensus levels. However, although we could identify these
tendencies, we also saw the system can re°ect the positive and typical diversity of
human interactions. If we do not forget that the real world is diversi¯ed, and that
diversity is a bene¯t, then our approach does not lead to a very in°exible system but
rather to a system that can take advantage of it.
As future work, we intend to study ways to deal with complex situations. We
consider a complex situation, for example, a scenario where all agents have the
Dominating style of behavior. The idea is to take advantage of the previous
knowledge that tells us how di±cult it is to achieve a consensual decision in that
context and ¯nd speci¯c mechanisms for that kind of scenarios. These mechanisms
should follow the logic applied to this work meaning the goal should always be to seek
consensus through the free exchange of knowledge and motivate the decision-makers











































































































































to understand arguments exchanged by other decision-makers. Another question we
intend to study is how the entire decision-making process (and not only a simple
iteration as studied in this work) using our framework model allows us to achieve
even higher levels of consensus and satisfaction.
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